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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ECS/AKZO
STANDARD FOR PREDATORY PRICING IN THE E.E.C.:
DETERRENCE OR DISORDER?
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 1983 the Commission of the European Communities (Com-
mission),' acting on a complaint2 made in June of 1982 by Engineering
I The Commission of the European Communities is one of four institutions of
the European Economic Community (EEC). The Treaty Establishing the European
Communities, done at Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of
Rome), established the EEC, which currently includes: Belgium, Denmark, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome
delineates the EEC power structure into four separate institutions: the Assembly
(European Parliament), the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Justice.
Article 155 of the Treaty specifies the purpose and duties of the Commission:
In order to ensure the proper functioning and development of the Com-
mon Market the Commission shall: ensure that the provisions of this Treaty
and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto are applied...
[and] exercise the powers conferred on it by the Council for the imple-
mentation of the rules laid down by the latter.
Id. at art. 155.
The Commission's broad powers in the area of antitrust law, known as competition
law in Europe, make it the primary source of that law in the EEC. Through its
powers of investigation, powers to order termination of infringement, and powers
to impose fines, the Commission essentially determines the competition policy of
the EEC. For further discussion on the Commission's role in competition law, see
Schrans, The Community and its Institutions, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
CoMMuNITIEs, THIRTY YEARs OF COMMUNITY LAW 24-27 (1983). See also C. BELLAMY
& G. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 4-6 (1978).
2 Plaintiff corporation made its complaint to the Commission pursuant to article
3 of Regulation No. 17 of the European Council. The Council designed Regulation
No. 17 to empower the Commission in competition matters to undertake necessary
investigations, to impose fines, and to end infringements. Article 3 states:
1. Where the Commission, upon application or upon its own intitiative,
finds that there is infringement of Article 85 or Article 86 of the Treaty,
it may by decision require the undertakings or associations of undertakings
concerned to bring such infringement to an end.
2. Those entitled to make application are:
(a) Member States
(b) natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest
3. Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Regulation the Com-
mission may, before taking a decision under paragraph 1, address to the
undertakings or associations of undertakings concerned recommendations
for termination of the infringement.
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 17, 5 J.0. CoMM. EUR. 204 (1962) (regulation of
the Council of Europe) [hereinafter Regulation No. 17].
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and Chemical Supplies (Epsom and Gloucester) Ltd., United Kingdom
(ECS),3 initiated proceedings against AKZO Chemie BV, the Neth-
erlands (AKZO).4 The complaint lodged by ECS alleged that AKZO
had, contrary to article 86 of the European Economic Community
Treaty (Treaty of Rome),5 abused its dominant position6 in the Eu-
I Eng'g and Chem. Supplies (Epsom and Gloucester) Ltd. v. AKZO Chemie
BV, 28 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 374) 1 (1985). [hereinafter ECS/AKZO Final
Decision]. ECS was at the time of the complaint a small, privately owned producer
of benzoyl peroxide in the United Kingdom. ECS mainly manufactured and marketed
flour additives, including benzoyl peroxide-based bleaching agents, but in 1975 ECS
also began producing benzoyl peroxide for use as a catalyst in the polymer industry.
Id. at 5.
4 Id. at 2. AKZO Chemie BV [hereinafter AKZO Chemie] and its subsidiaries
comprise the specialty chemicals division of AKZO NV, a large multinational producer
of chemicals and fibers. AKZO Chemie, at the time of the complaint, produced
organic peroxides including benzoyl peroxide. Id.
I Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 86. Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome
addresses the common rules concerning the Community's competition policy. Article
86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade
between member states.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. The Court of Justice in Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can Co. v.
Comm'n of the European Communities, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm.
Mkt L.R. 199 (1973), declared that the abusive practices listed in article 86 do not
comprise an exhaustive enumeration of abuses, but are simply examples. Id. at 245,
12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 224.
The Commission bases its competition policy primarily on article 3(f) of the Treaty,
which posits that "the activities of the Community shall include ... (f) the institution
of a system ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 3.
6 The Treaty of Rome does not define the term "dominant." However, several
general criteria are customarily applied in determining whether a business enterprise
might hold a dominant position. One major factor is the size of the undertaking
in relation to whether it is large enough to be able to conduct its business without
regard for the effect that its conduct has on its competitors, suppliers, or customers.
The Court of Justice has held that such an undertaking enjoys a dominant position.
United Brands Co. and United Brands Continental BV v. Comm'n of the European
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ropean Economic Community (EEC) organic peroxides market. 7 This
alleged abusive conduct consisted of systematic predatory and dis-
criminatory pricing8 by AKZO, executed through its subsidiary AKZO
UK Ltd. (AKZO UK). 9 ECS complained that AKZO implemented its
pricing policy in response to ECS' expansion into the plastics sector
of the organic peroxides market in the United Kingdom and Ger-
many. l0 ECS also claimed that AKZO UK intended that its low prices
eliminate ECS as a competitor in the EEC organic peroxide market."
Communities, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978).
Also, the firm must possess a large share of the relevant market; a market share
several times greater than that of its nearest competitor could be a strong indication
of dominance. Metro SB - Grossmarket GmbH & Co., KG v. Comm'n of the
European Communities, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1353, 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
1 (1978). In addition, geographic size of the relevant market, substitutability of the
product in question, and existing barriers to entry into the field all may help determine
whether an enterprise commands a dominant position in the market. For a more
thorough discussion of dominance, see R. GRAUPNBR, THE RULES OF COMPETTON
IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 11 (1965).
1 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 1. Organic
peroxides are specialty chemicals used mainly in the polymer industry. Benzoyl
peroxide, the major organic peroxide in terms of production and variety of uses,
is widely utilized in the polymer sector. In the instant matter, benzoyl peroxide is
important in its specialized use as a bleaching agent for flour. Id. at 3.
I See infra notes 31, 75 and accompanying text.
9 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. ER. Com. (No. L 374) at 1. AKZO
UK is a wholly-owned subsidiary of AKZO Chemie. AKZO UK manufactures and
markets specialty chemicals for AKZO Chemie in the United Kingdom. These chem-
icals include organic peroxides for the polymer industry and benzoyl peroxide for
use as a bleaching agent in the commercial baking of bread. Id. at 2. This Note
hereinafter adopts the Commission's clarification of AKZO's various entities, which
explains that "the term AKZO is used to indicate the single economic unit formed
by AKZO Chemie BV and its subsidiary companies. When the context requires a
distinction to be made between parent and subsidiary, AKZO Chemie BV is referred
to as 'AKZO Chemie' and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd. as 'AKZO UK.' " Id. at 2,
n. 1.
,0 Id. at 2. ECS originally purchased its benzoyl peroxide in bulk from AKZO
UK but began, in 1977, to develop its own production capabilities for flour additives.
Id. at 6. In 1979 ECS decided to expand from producing solely for the flour additives
sector, and thus began to produce benzoyl peroxide in forms suitable for sale in
the more lucrative bulk polymer industry. ECS at first sold benzoyl peroxide in this
form to United Kingdom clients only; in September 1979, however, ECS sold its
first consignment of bulk benzoyl peroxide to BASF of Ludswigshafen, a major
AKZO customer, at a price 15-2001o lower than that charged by AKZO at the time.
Id. at 7.
11 Id. at 6-7. ECS was at the time of the dispute AKZO UK's closest competitor
in the United Kingdom and Ireland flour bleaching agents market. According to
AKZO figures, AKZO UK held a 1982 market share of 52076, while ECS' share of
the same market in 1982 was 35%. Id. at 5.
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The Commission investigated the complaint during 1982,12 and in
July of 1983, issued an interim measures decision13 ordering AKZO
UK to raise its profits to the levels realized before it began the alleged
predatory and discriminatory pricing.' 4 On December 14, 1985, the
Commission issued its final decision on the matter, holding that
AKZO had abused its dominant position in the EEC organic peroxide
market by pursuing a strategy of predatory pricing in the United
Kingdom flour additives sector. The Commission determined that
12 Id. at 8. The Commission conducted surprise investigations at AKZO Chemie
and AKZO UK offices in December 1982, pursuant to article 14(1) of Regulation
No. 17, which states in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission may undertake all necessary investigation into under-
takings and associations of undertakings. To this end the officials authorized
by the Commission are empowered:
a. to examine the books and other business records;
b. to take copies of or extracts from the books and business records;
c. to ask for oral examinations on the spot;
d. to enter any premises, land and means of transport of undertakings.
Regulation No. 17, supra note 2, art. 14(1). Through these investigations the Com-
mission obtained a number of important internal documents implicating AKZO UK
in a concerted effort to initiate a policy of predatory and discriminatory pricing.
ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. Eup. Comm. (No. L 374) at 8. See infra notes
86-90 and accompanying text. For a case analysis concerning the Commission's
investigatory powers under Regulation No. 17, see Recent Development, National
Panasonic (U.K.) Ltd. v. E.C. Commission: Antitrust Investigations in the European
Economic Community, 11 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 177 (1981).
13 Eng'g and Chem. Supplies (Epsom and Gloucester) Ltd. v. AKZO Chemie UK
Ltd., 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 252) 13 [hereinafter ECS/AKZO Interim Measures
Decision]. In Camera Care Ltd. v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1980
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, 27 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 334 (1980), the Court of Justice
bestowed upon the Commission the power to adopt "any preliminary measures which
... appear necessary [to the Commission] at any given moment," within the context
of a decision requiring termination of an infringement of EEC competition rules.
Id. at 131, 27 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 347. The Commission noted the conditions
necessary for the granting of interim measures: the establishment by sufficiently
clear evidence of a likelihood of infringement under article 85 or article 86; the
likelihood of serious and irreparable harm to the applicant unless measures are
ordered; and proven urgency. ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. Eux.
Comm. (No. L 252) at 17. The Commission determined that the circumstances of
the case fulfilled these requirements, and in its annex to the decision, detailed
allowable prices which AKZO UK could thereafter charge its customers. The Com-
mission declared that AKZO UK could only lower those prices to meet, but not
undercut, another supplier's lower price offer. Id. at 20.
', See supra note 13.
'S ECS/AKZ0 Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 374) at 25. The
Commission concluded:
(ii) AKZO abused its dominant position in the EEC organic peroxides
market by the making of threats to ECS in late 1979 and then systematic
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AKZO's strategy was designed to eliminate ECS from the larger,
more lucrative plastics sector of the EEC organic peroxides market,
and was therefore abusive conduct within the prohibition of article
86 of the Treaty of Rome.' 6 The Commission imposed an exemplary
fine of 10 million ECU 17 upon AKZO and later referred to AKZO's
behavior as "one of the worst forms of infringement under article
86."1 AKZO subsequently lodged an action for annulment, now
pending, with the European Court of Justice.' 9
implementation since the end of 1980 of a course of commercial behavior
in the flour additives sector designed to damage the business of ECS and
in the long term secure its withdrawal as a competitor from the organic
peroxides market thereby reinforcing by unfair means the dominant position
of AKZO.
16 Id.
," Id. at 27. The European currency unit, or ECU, is integral to the monetary
system of the EEC. According to the Commission, the ECU serves four different
functions:
(i) it acts as a numeraire in that each currency has a central rate expressed
in this unit; (ii) as a central point of reference it indicates when currencies
are spreading apart from each other ('divergence indicator'); (iii) it acts as
a denomination through which intervention and credit is extended by the
authorities; and (iv) it acts as a means of settlement between the Com-
munity's monetary authorities.
McMahon, Progress Toward Economic and Monetary Union, in CoMMISSION OF THE
EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrnIs, THIRTY YEARS OF COMMUNITY LAW 409 (1983).
At the time of the decision, 10 million ECU equalled 24,696,000 Dutch florins
($U.S. 8,689,655), the highest fine the Commission has ever imposed on any firm.
The Commission sanctioned the fine according to article 15 of Regulation No. 17,
which allows for fines of up to 1 million ECU or 10% of the turnover of the guilty
undertaking in the preceeding business year, whichever is greater. ECS/AKZO Final
Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 25. The Commission also ordered
AKZO to offer the same terms and conditions to all its current and prospective
customers, and to report its compliance to the Commission for the following five
years. Id. at 27.
" COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TrTION POLICY 85 (1986).
19 The European Court of Justice, located in Luxembourg, consists of twelve
judges unanimously elected by the governments of the EEC member states. According
to the Treaty of Rome, the role of the Court of Justice is to "ensure that the law
is observed in the interpretation and implementation of the Treaty." Treaty of Rome,
supra note 1, art. 164.
The judges are assisted by several advocates-general, who are required by the
Treaty to "make reasoned submissions in open court, with complete impartiality
and independence" on cases before the Court of Justice. Id. at art. 166. The opinions
of the advocates-general are in no way binding upon the Court, but are invariably
published with the judgment of the Court and often relied upon by the Court in
its decision. See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
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The ECS/AKZO decision marked the first time the Commission
has addressed the issue of predatory pricing. Although the Com-
mission unequivocally condemned AKZO's conduct, it failed to either
adopt or devise any concrete method for determining what prices are
predatory. Instead, the Commission relied heavily on an abundance
of subjective evidence, consisting mainly of internal AKZO memo-
randa and documents, which substantiated AKZO's predatory intent.
In using this evidence to support its finding the Commission neglected
to properly stress the objective evidence present - the relationship
between AKZO UK's prices and its costs of doing business. Due to
its failure to apply a more comprehensive standard of analysis, the
Commission may encounter substantial difficulty in determining pre-
dation in future matters where subjective evidence is not present.
Commurrms 146-48.
Article 173 provides for the right to appeal Commission decisions:
Supervision of the legality of acts taken by the Council and the Com-
mission other than recommendations or opinions shall be a matter for the
Court of Justice. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in proceedings
instituted by a member state, the Council or the Commission, on the grounds
of lack of jurisdiction, infringement of important procedural rules, in-
fringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application,
or misuse of powers.
Any natural or legal person may, subject to the same conditions, have
recourse against a decision directed to him or it or against a decision which,
although in the form of a regulation or a decision directed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to him or to it.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 173.
Regulation No. 17 delineates the Court's power to review Commission competition
decisions, specifying that "Itihe Court of Justice shall have unlimited jurisdiction
within the meaning of article 172 of the Treaty to review decisions whereby the
Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment; it may cancel, reduce or
increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed." Regulation No. 17, supra
note 2, art. 17. Article 172 of the Treaty states that "[r]egulations made by the
Council pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty may confer on the Court of Justice
plenary jurisdiction in regard to the penalties provided for in such regulations."
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 172.
Proceedings in a direct action such as AKZO's appeal advance in four distinct
phases: the written procedure stage, the directions and inquiries stage, the oral
procedure, and the judgment. In the first phase, the parties to the dispute (in this
case, AKZO and the Commission) submit their written arguments to the Court. At
the directions and inquiries stage, the Court decides what further steps need to be
taken and makes inquiries into issues of fact. The oral procedure includes a hearing
and delivery of the advocate-general's opinion. Finally, the Court releases its judgment
in the matter. At the time of publication, the Court had recently completed the
written stage of the AKZO appeal process. For a detailed discussion of European
Court of Justice procedure, see LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 29-46 (1984).
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This Note proposes that the Commission could more effectively
detect and deter predatory pricing in the EEC by adopting a test for
predation which sufficiently examines both objective and subjective
evidence. This Note further posits that the Commission's future ap-
plication of such an analysis would ensure effective prosecution of
predatory firms when little or no subjective evidence is available,
while giving proper emphasis to such evidence when it is present.
This Note also proposes that adoption of a comprehensive test for
predation would afford EEC firms more guidance and a greater degree
of predictability concerning the fairness of the prices they set. Finally,
this Note suggests that the European Court of Justice, upon consid-
eration of AKZO's action for annulment, urge the Commission to
apply a comprehensive standard in future EEC predation cases.
II. STANDARDS FOR UNFAIR PRICING IN THE EEC
The drafters of the Treaty of Rome2° intended article 86, through
its prohibition of abusive conduct by a dominant "undertaking '2 1
to act as a device for the maintenance of free competition in the
European common market. 22 Subsection (a) of article 86 denotes as
abusive conduct the practice of a dominant undertaking "directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
20 Representatives of six European governments-Belgium, the Federal Republic
of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands-signed the Treaty
of Rome on March 27, 1957. By signing this Treaty, the contracting parties agreed
to "establish among themselves a European Economic Community." Treaty of Rome,
supra note 1, art. 1. Article 2 presents the lofty goals of the original parties to the
Treaty:
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of member states,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of eco-
nomic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in sta-
bility, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations
between the States belonging to it.
Id. at art. 2. The remainder of the Treaty sets out the methods for accomplishing
these goals, including the formation of the Assembly, the Council, the Commission,
and the Court of Justice. For a comprehensive introduction to the EEC, see LASOK
& BRmGE, supra note 19.
21 The Treaty of Rome does not define the term "undertaking." However, its
common understanding "is recognized as referring to any economic unit-either a
single individual or several individuals combined in a partnership or corporation-
which is concerned with the production or distribution of goods or the provision
of services." GRAUPNER, supra note 6, at 11.
22 See supra note 5.
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trading conditions. "23 Article 86 does not, however, indicate exactly
what constitutes an unfair price. This lack of definition requires the
Commission and the Court of Justice to examine the price that an
undertaking imposes and its relationship to the costs of doing business
to determine the fairness of that imposed price. 24
Article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome, which restricts virtually any
anti-competitive conduct, lends essential guidance to the interpretation
of article 86. Article 3(f) states that "the activities of the Community
shall include . .. (g) the institution of a system ensuring that com-
petition in the common market is not distorted. ' 25 In Europemballage
Corp. and Continental Can Co. v. Commission of the European
Communities,26 the Court of Justice declared that "[a]rticle 3 con-
siders the pursuit of the objectives which it lays down to be indis-
pensable for the achievement of the Community's tasks. ' 27 The Court
then found articles 85 through 90 to be the proper legal means by
which to accomplish the protection of free competition in the EEC."
Additionally, in Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Com-
mercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties,29 the Court held that the expanse of article 86 covers not only
abuses which may directly prejudice consumers, but also abuses which
harm consumers indirectly by distorting the competitive structure
outlined in article 3(f).30
23 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at art. 86.
14 Article 164 of the Treaty of Rome empowers the Court of Justice to "ensure
that the law is observed in the interpretation . . . of this Treaty." Treaty of Rome,
supra note 1, at art. 164. As stated by Advocate General Mayras in BRT v. Sabam
and NV Fonior, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238 (1974),
"the concept of abuse . . . is not defined by article 86, which only goes so far as
to give some examples of abuse. It must thus be determined according to the individual
case." Opinion of Advocate General Mayras, id. at 324, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
277. Both the Commission and the Court of Justice in several cases have considered
the definition of unfair trading prices, listed as an abuse under article 86. See infra
notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
23 Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at art. 3(f). The Commission emphasized the
importance of implementing a competition policy in its First Report on Competition
Policy, stating that "[clompetition is the-best stimulant of economic activity since
it guarantees the widest possible freedom of action to all . . . . Competition policy
is an essential means for satisfying to a great extent the individual and collective
needs of our society." COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN ComMUNrrms, FIRsT REPORT
ON COMPETITION POLICY 11 (1972).
26 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199 (1973).
27 Id. at 244, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 223.
28 Id. at 245, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 224.
29 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 309 (1974).
30 Id. at 246, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 342.
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Predatory pricing is one example of abusive conduct that not only
may cause consumers direct harm, but also may distort the EEC's
competitive structure. Predatory pricing generally refers to an un-
dertaking's offense of charging nonrenumerative, or below cost, prices
with the intent of restricting competition. The predator then raises
its prices above its costs as it gains market power, ultimately charging
excessively high prices and reaping monopoly profits. 3 To achieve
such market power, the predator usually must eliminate viable com-
petitors. The capacity to eliminate competitors exists when a firm
possesses a dominant, or monopolistic, position.3 2 The Court of Jus-
tice has not yet considered whether predatory pricing by a dominant
firm distorts the pro-competitive structure envisaged in article 3(f).33
The Court in Continental Can, however, reasoned that, because article
3(f) provides for the institution of a system en~uring that competition
in the EEC remain undistorted, that article requires a fortiori that
competition not be eliminated.34
Although the Court and Commission lack experience in examining
the imposition of excessively low prices, both have declared the
31 The standard definition of predatory pricing is that posited by Joskow and
Klevorick:
Predatory pricing behavior involves a reduction of price in the short run
so as to drive competing firms out of the market or to discourage entry
of new firms in an effort to gain larger profits via higher prices in the
long run than would have been earned if the price reduction had not
occurred.
Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979).
32 See supra note 6.
33 Though the Court of Justice has not addressed the substantive matters involved
in ECS/AKZO, it already has decided two procedural issues presented by AKZO.
In AKZO Chemie v. Commission, 48 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 231 (1987), AKZO appealed
a decision by the Commission dated December 18, 1984 instructing AKZO to com-
municate to ECS documents of a confidential nature. The Court held that the
Commission, by delivering the documents to ECS before informing AKZO of its
actions, "made it impossible for [AKZO] to avail itself of the remedies afforded
by the combined provisions of articles 173 and 185 of the Treaty to prevent the
contested decision from being carried out." Id. at 260. The Court voided the
Commission's decision and ordered it to pay costs. Id.
The second matter, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, 48 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 225
(1987), concerned a Commission decision dated November 6, 1984 requiring AKZO
to submit to Commission investigations. The Court rejected AKZO's appeal and
ordered AKZO to pay costs. Id. at 230.
3, Europemballage Corp. and Continental Can v. Commission of the European
Communities, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 244, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 199,
223 (1973).
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charging of certain high prices to be "unfair" and, therefore, abusive
conduct under article 86. In General Motors Continentaal NV. v.
Commission of the European Communities," the Court of Justice
upheld the Commission's ruling that high prices charged by General
Motors for automobile inspections were prohibited under article 86(a).36
Similarly, when the defendant in United Brands Co. and United
Brands Continental B V. v. Commission of the European Communities7
charged a higher price for bananas in one market as compared to
others, the Court determined that imposing a high price which bore
no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied
constituted abusive conduct.38
Thus, a dominant undertaking's charging of excessively high prices
may indicate an infringement of article 3(f) of the Treaty of Rome
and, therefore, may be prohibited under article 86(a). Though neither
General Motors nor United Brands addressed low prices, the Com-
mission attempted to formulate a standard for an "unfair" price.
Choosing to follow its historical pattern of avoiding traditional cost
analysis, 39 the Commission employed a nebulous concept labelled
"economic value." In General Motors the Commission compared the
prices charged by General Motors for the inspection of automobiles
imported within General Motor's system with the prices imposed for
the same inspection by private dealers outside of General Motors.
Upon finding that the General Motors prices were significantly higher,
the Commission declared them in excess of their economic value and
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 95 (1976). This was
a review of the Commission's decision in Re General Motors Continental NV, 18
0.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 29) 14 (1975).
36 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1379, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 110.
17 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429 (1978). This was
a review of the Commission's decision in Re the United Brands Co., 19 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 95) 1 (1976).
38 United Brands, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
502.
39 In its Fifth Report on Competition Policy, the Commission stated that "[in
proceedings against abuse consisting of charging excessively high prices, it is difficult
to tell whether, in any given case, an abusive price has been set since there is no
objective way of establishing what price covers cost plus a reasonable profit margin."
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrEs, Fm- REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
60 (1975). The Court of Justice disagreed with this view in United Brands, declaring
that an excessive price "could . . . be determined objectively if it were possible for
it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of the product
in question and its cost of production, which would disclose the amount of the
profit margin." United Brands, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. at 502.
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therefore unfair. 40 Similarly, in United Brands the Commission de-
termined that United Brands' banana prices in some EEC countries
were up to fifty percent higher than its prices in Ireland.4 ' On this
basis, the Commission deemed the prices United Brands charged in
those countries excessive and therefore abusive under article 86(a). 42
The Court of Justice, in reviewing the Commission's decision in
General Motors, accepted the Commission's notion of economic value. 43
The Court, however, rejected the same reasoning in United Brands,
directing the Commission instead to discern whether the difference
between the price actually charged and the costs actually incurred
exceeded the product's economic value. 4 Additionally, the Court
recommended that if the Commission encountered an excessive price,
it should consider whether that price was excessive either in itself or
when compared to competing products. 45 Finally, the Court advised
the Commission to conduct detailed cost analyses in future predation
cases, through the examination of complete production costs and
margin data, in determining abusive price levels. 46
III. THE COMMISSION'S DECISIONS IN ECS/AKZO
A. Predatory Pricing as Abusive Conduct
The Commission's finding in ECS/AKZO that predatory pricing
constitutes an abuse under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome evidences
a critical development toward the maintenance of free and undistorted
40 General Motors, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1379, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 110. The Commission posited that an abuse of article 86(a) existed when a
dominant enterprise charged a price "which [is] excessive in relation to the economic
value of the service provided." Id.
4' United Brands, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 219, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
503.
42 Id.
,3 General Motors, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1379, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
at 110.
" United Brands, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 301, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at
502.
4 Id. at 301-02, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 502-503.
"6 Id. at 302, 21 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 503. The Court appreciated the complexity
of working out production costs, and therefore presented some guidelines to aid the
Commission in such analyses. Citing a study done by the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development, the Court recommended that the Commission focus
upon such cost factors as "the pattern of the production, packaging, transportation,
marketing, and distribution" in computing approximate production costs, and to
then determine whether prices charged were excessive. Id.
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competition in the EEC. Unfortunately, the Commission did not
devise or adopt any objective method for determining when predatory
prices exist. Because of this shortcoming, the decision failed to es-
tablish an adequate standard for future analyses of predation in the
European common market.
The Commission's examination of predatory pricing in its ECS/
AKZO Interim Measures Decision involved a case of first impression.47
The original complaint filed by ECS with the Commission on June
15, 1982,48 indicated that in December 1979, representatives from
AKZO Chemie and AKZO UK threatened to force ECS from the
market by selling AKZO products below cost. 49 According to ECS,
this was an AKZO response to ECS' expansion of its benzoyl peroxide
manufacturing from the flour milling sector of the market to the
plastics sector.50 The threat allegedly specified that AKZO would take
this action unless ECS withdrew from the plastics sector. 5 When
ECS refused, AKZO reportedly carried out its threat. 52
In its ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision the Commission la-
belled ECS "a small independent producer of benzoyl peroxide." 53
Benzoyl peroxide is an organic peroxide used in both plastics and
flour-treating.5 4 The Commission then noted that AKZO UK, also a
producer of benzoyl peroxide, possessed a 1982 total turnover which
was many times greater than that of ECS. 55 The Commission con-
tinued by declaring AKZO UK the leading producer in all relevant
, ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 252) at
13 (1983). See supra note 13.
1 ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 252) at
13. ECS filed a formal application with the Commission pursuant to article 3 of
Regulation No. 17. See Regulation No. 17, supra note 2.
,9 ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 252) at
14.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. ECS orginally brought the matter before the High Court of Justice in
London, which granted an ex parte interim injunction prohibiting AKZO from
reducing its prices. AKZO ultimately agreed not to lower its normal selling prices
for benzoyl peroxide if the intention of the price reduction was to elimiante ECS.
AKZO's agreement, which had the force of an injunction, expired in September,
1982. Id.
13 Id. at 13.
-Id.
11 Id. at 14. ECS had a total turnover in 1982 of £1.7 million (2,087,000 ECU).
At the 1982 average year rate, £1.7 million equaled $U.S. 971,151 AKZO UK's total
turnover in 1982 amounted to £42,868,974 (76,478,000 ECU). At the 1982 average
yearly rate, £42,868,974 equalled $U.S. 24,489,560.
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markets,5 6 and found AKZO UK's economic power sufficient to both
determine price levels in those markets and to eliminate smaller
competitors.17
The Commission followed its discussion of market power in its
Interim Measures Decision by stating that "the charging of unfairly
low selling prices in order to drive out a smaller competitor or offer
it the choice between liquidation or acquisition by the dominant
undertaking would fall within the terms of ... [article 86(a)]." s The
Commission neglected to provide a legal basis for this landmark
ruling, which represented the first official recognition of predatory
pricing as abusive conduct under article 86.59
In its final decision on the ECS complaint, the Commission nar-
rowed the relevant markets to one, the EEC organic peroxides market. 60
56 Id. at 18. The first essential element required for application of article 86 is
the existence of a dominant position. Whether a dominant position exists depends
to a large extent upon the relevant market under examination. The relevant market
defines the area of effective competition, and is determined by its geographic di-
mension and its product category. The deduction of the relevant market or markets
varies with the facts of a given case; a broader market definition usually aids the
defendant by decreasing his percentage share of the market, but see infra note 57.
For a discussion of relevant markets see Van Bael and Bellis, European Economic
Community, in WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION § 401[1] (J. von Kalinowski ed. 1982).
57 ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. EUR. Comm. (No. L 252) at
18. The markets considered relevant by the Commission in the ECS/AKZO Interim
Measures Decision included the EEC organic peroxides market as a whole, the United
Kingdom flour-milling additives market, and the United Kingdom submarket for
flour-milling benzoyl peroxide. Id. In reaching its conclusions, the Commission relied
upon AKZO estimates of its own market shares and those of ECS. In the 1982
EEC organic peroxides market, AKZO Chemie placed its share at 46% to 50%.
AKZO estimated ECS' share of the same market was 1%. Id. at 14. AKZO estimated
its share of the 1982 United Kingdom sub-market for flour-milling benzoyl peroxide
at 52%, compared with ECS' share of 3507o. Id. at 15. The Commission encountered
difficulty in determining the respective shares of AKZO and ECS of the United
Kingdom flour additives market, but concluded that AKZO UK appeared to have
the largest share in that market. Id.
"' Id. at 18. The Commission posited as one of the conditions to be met to grant
interim measures "the establishment by sufficiently clear evidence of a likelihood
of infringement." Id. at 17. The Commission apparently felt that "a sufficient
presumption of a dominant position" was enough for it to then consider whether
AKZO had acted abusively.
59 The Commission, however, had informally considered predatory pricing as far
back as 1966, when it opined that "price competition that is engaged for the purpose
of ousting from the market a competitor who does not have sufficient financial
resources to withstand for a longer period sales below cost price" might constitute
abusive conduct under article 86. Le Problems de la Concentration dans le Marche
Commun., Etudes CEE, Serie Concurrence No. 3 at 29 (1966), as translated in Van
Bael & Bellis, supra note 56, § 5.04.
6o ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No L 374) at 17.
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The Commission found this market to be the one from which AKZO
sought in the long term to exclude ECS. 61 Upon examination of this
market, the Commission discovered that AKZO possessed highly
influential market power over both the price levels and competition
in the market. 62 In addition, AKZO estimated its own share of the
market at fifty percent or greater, and had by its own account
successfully eliminated competition from that market in the past. 63
Combining this information with AKZO documents which demon-
strated the company's ability to prevent smaller firms from penetrating
its markets, the Commission concluded that at all material times
AKZO occupied a dominant position in the EEC market for organic
peroxides. 64
The Commission next considered whether AKZO's conduct
amounted to an abuse under article 86. In contrast to its Interim
Measures Decision, the Commission in its final decision conducted
a detailed examination of the relevant case law and the Treaty of
Rome in finding AKZO's conduct abusive. Citing the Continental
Can and Commercial Solvents decisions, the Commission declared
that any behavior which undermines the purpose of article 3(f) may
constitute an abuse of a dominant position under article 86.65 Re-
iterating the Continental Can holding, the Commission concluded
that any unfair commercial practice by a dominant undertaking in-
tended to "eliminate, discipline or deter" smaller competitors would
come within the scope of article 86's prohibition. 66
61 Id. at 17. The Commission determined that the geographic market in question
included the entire EEC, since AKZO supplied its organic peroxides to all member
states and because AKZO believed its geographic spread was significantly important
to its market strength. Id.
62 Id. at 18.
63 Id. In 1981, Scado, a producer of flour additives, withdrew from the EEC
market. Annual AKZO reports from 1980 to 1981 document AKZO's belief that it
had caused Scado's withdrawal through an aggresive AKZO pricing campaign leveled
against Scado. Id.
Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission also noted that AKZO's market
share was equal to the market shares of all its competitors combined, that AKZO's
market share had remained constant, and that AKZO offered a far broader range
of products than any of its competitors. Id.
65 Id. at 19.
- Id. Later in the decision the Commission held that "[t]he pursuance by a
dominant firm of a stretegy (sic) of eliminating competitors or potential competitors
by unfair means differing from normal competition would in principle fall under
article 86 whatever the detailed mode of implementation." Id. at 20.
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B. The Commission's Cost Analyses, the Subjective Evidence,
and the Commission's Test for Predation
In its complaint ECS alleged that AKZO intended to eliminate ECS
through deep and prolonged price cutting. 67 The Commission re-
sponded by examining the relationship between AKZO's prices and
costs. Perhaps because the ECS/AKZO matter presented the Com-
mission with its first opportunity to consider predatory pricing as a
method of elimination, the Commission's attempt to address the
subject in its Interim Measures Decision proved cursory at best. In
this initial decision, the Commission disregarded the Court of Justice's
United Brands advice to seek complete production lost and margin
data in determining abusive price levels; the Commission instead relied
upon references to AKZO UK's "below cost prices" and sales "at
a loss. ''68 The Commission gave no indication what objective pricing
evidence, if any, it analyzed in concluding that AKZO UK's prices
were below cost. 69
In its final decision the Commission conducted a more thorough
examination of AKZO UK's prices and costs. The Commission began
by documenting a detailed AKZO plan to offer each of ECS' cus-
tomers a range of flour additives at prices far below the then-prevailing
level. 70 Other AKZO documents predicted that the successful capture
of ECS' customers, with these attractive prices as bait, would result
in a total loss to AKZO of Dutch Fl 170,000 per annum. 71 AKZO UK in
fact raised its prices for its own customers by ten percent in early
1980, while ECS prices to its own customers remained the same. 72
This AKZO increase widened the customary price gap between the
two suppliers, causing two of AKZO UK's customers to approach
ECS for price quotations. 73 When ECS quoted one AKZO UK cus-
67 Id. at 19.
68 ECS/AKZO Interim Measures Decision, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 252) at
16.
69 This may have been due to a lack of objective evidence at the time of the
Interim Measures Decision. Though the Commission remarked that it possessed
"details of costings" at that time, id., in its final decision the Commission described
the earlier proceedings as a period "[diuring . . . which relatively limited financial
and accounting information was available." ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J.
EUR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 19.
70 Id. at 8-9.
71 Id. at 9.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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tomer its then-current prices for flour additives, which were lower
than AKZO UK's prices, AKZO UK began markedly dropping its
own prices.
74
By December of 1980, AKZO UK was making selective offers to
ECS' customers which were much lower than ECS' prices for those
customers, and which were twenty to thirty percent below AKZO
UK's price for its own customers for the same product.75 As a result
of AKZO UK's systematic low price offers, ECS gradually lost the
business of three large customers and several smaller buyers. 76 ECS
retained the business of several other customers only by reducing its
prices to match AKZO UK's offers despite substantial cost increases
for labor and raw materials. 77 Ultimately, ECS lost almost one-third
of its flour additives business in the United Kingdom.78
Following its examination of AKZO's plan to recruit ECS cus-
tomers, the Commission considered AKZO UK's variable costs of
74 Id.
11 Id. at 10. Such selective charging of different prices to different firms for the
same product is known as discriminatory pricing. Discriminatory pricing may con-
stitute an abuse under article 86(c) of the Treaty of Rome, which prohibits "applying
in relation to like parties unequal conditions in respect of like transactions, placing
them thereby at a comparative disadvantage." Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, at
art. 86. The Commission addressed the discrimatory pricing present in the instant
matter by remarking that "the anticompetitive effect of AKZO's differential pricing
involved not so much direct injury to customers but rather a serious impact on the
structure of competition at the level of supply by reason of its exclusionary effect."
ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 22.
76 Id. at 11.
77 Id.
71 Id. at 14. In addition, the general decline in prices of flour additives forced
ECS to "increase its bank borrowings substantially" in order to remain in business.
Id. Due to its lack of available funds, ECS also reduced its budget for research
and development, and delayed modifications to its plant. Id.
The Commission noted that AKZO "contested every important allegation of fact
set out in the complaint of ECS and in the statement of objections." Id. at 11.
According to the Commission, AKZO essentially claimed that "the Commission...
allowed itself to be duped by [ECS] which was out to shift the blame for its own
poor performance and bad investment decisions on to other participants in the
market and ultimately on to the consumer." Id.
The Commission, however, refused to accept AKZO's arguments due to the
documentary evidence present. The Commission emphasized that before 1980, AKZO
UK effectively determined flour additives prices in the United Kingdom. Id. Though
AKZO argued that it had to drop its prices as a defensive measure against ECS
attempts to win over AKZO customers, the Commission countered that "[the
circumstances and timing of the approaches made .by AKZO UK to [ECS customers]
are indicative of an aggressive campaign to displace the regular supplier." Id. at
11-12.
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doing business. The Commission began by indicating that not only
did AKZO UK supply particular ECS customers products at below-
cost prices, but also that between 1981 and 1983 AKZO UK's entire
flour additives business operated at a loss. 79 AKZO countered that
its flour additives prices were above its variable costs, and therefore
"always included a profit margin." ' 0 In response, the Commission
noted that under AKZO's accounting classification, variable cost
included only the cost of raw materials, energy packaging, and trans-
port.8 ' AKZO treated several other major items, including labor,
maintenance, warehousing, and dispatching, as fixed costs, although
according to the Commission, accounting systems usually consider
such items variable costs.8 2 The Commission adjusted AKZO's cal-
culations to include these items as variable costs, then determined
that the prices AKZO offered to ECS' customers between 1981 and
1984 fell well short of covering normally-defined variable costs. 8 3
Although the Commission mapped out a detailed analysis of AKZO
UK's costs and prices, it discounted the importance of the results.
The Commission stated that "article 86 does not prescribe any cost-
based legal rule to define the precise stage at which price cutting by
a dominant firm may become abusive. ' ' 8 Thus, the Commission
refused to rely on an objective test for determining predation. 85 The
Commission based its hesitancy on a belief that a test which examined
only the aggressor's costs would fail to address all exclusionary con-
7' Id. at 14.
'0 Id. The Commission defined variables costs as "costs which vary with changes
in output and generally include materials, energy, direct labour, supervision, repair
and maintenance, and royalties." Id. at 15 n.1.
:I Id. at 15.
82 Id. For example, Areeda and Turner's definition of variable cost includes
"materials, fuel, labor directly used to produce the product, indirect labor such as
foremen, clerks, and custodial help, use-depreciation, repair and maintenance, and
per unit royalties and license fees." P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW §
712 (1978).
83 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) at 15. The
Commission continued by remarking that "[i]t is also important that in many cases
AKZO often did not have to supply the material at the prices which it offered,
leaving it to ECS to drop its prices so as to keep the customer and thus incur a
loss." Id.
84 Id. at 19.
85 AKZO argued that its prices should conclusively be declared legal if set above
its average variable costs. Id. AKZO based its argument on a test for predation
devised by Harvard University law professors Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner,
discussed infra notes 102-15 and accompanying text.
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duct, and that such a test would not lend sufficient weight to the
"strategic aspect" of predatory behavior.8 6
More important to the Commission than the cost analysis was the
wealth of subjective evidence present concerning AKZO's underlying
predatory intent.8 7 This evidence consisted of unambiguous AKZO
internal memoranda that documented a high level AKZO strategy to
discipline, if not destroy, ECS. 8 These memoranda showed that
AKZO's plan entailed offering prices below its costs to ECS customers
in response to ECS' refusal to abandon its expansion into the AKZO
dominated plastics industry.8 9 The Commission found that AKZO's
internal documentation not only directly contradicted its own argu-
ments, but also corroborated in every important aspect the allegations
of ECS. 9°
86 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 20.
87 The Commission acquired this evidence during surprise investigations at AKZO
Chemie and AKZO UK offices. See supra note 11.
88 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) at 8. The
Commission reported that it had "obtained from AKZO a number of important
internal [AKZO] documents." Id. One document particularly damaging to AKZO
was a note made by an AKZO manager, outlining the agendas of several meetings
between AKZO and ECS which he attended in late 1979. The memorandum, dated
December 7, 1979, "set out a detailed blueprint for the implementation of a plan
to discipline and if necessary eliminate ECS." Id. See infra note 89 and accompanying
text.
19 Id. The Commission quoted the AKZO memorandum:
Discussion took place in the office of Engineering and Chemical Supplies
at Stonehouse on 3 December. Mr. Sullivan, the managing director and
principal shareholder of ECS, was informed that he could not expect any
cooperation on the 'milling' side if he intended to enter the 'plastics'
industry. It was confirmed to Mr. Sullivan that AKZO would take aggressive
commercial action on the milling products unless he refrained from supplying
his products to the plastics industry. It was decided not to take any further
action until Tuesday, 11 December allowing time for Mr. Sullivan to react
to the above proposal . . . [If] Mr. Sullivan does not react by midday on
Tuesday, 11 December, the proposed action will be taken."
Id. The memorandum then outlined AKZO's predatory pricing strategy. Id. See supra
notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
Another incriminating AKZO document mentioned the general drop in flour
additives prices since 1979. This documented then "reported with satisfaction" that
the drop had hurt ECS' profit margins more than those of AKZO. ECS/AKZO
Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm&. (No. L 374) at 13. The report concluded that
one ECS customer had proven to be "a difficult 'nut' to crack," i.e., refused to
switch to AKZO products, but the report speculated that "in time some of the mill
[customers] will break away from ECS as pressure is maintained." Id.
90 Id. at 11.
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This subjective evidence greatly impressed the Commission, which
referred to it as "convincing documentary evidence of a detailed plan
. . . to eliminate ECS as a competitor."'" Notably, the Commission
also listed several objective factors which reinforced the subjective
evidence of AKZO's anticompetitive intent. Most important among
these factors were AKZO UK's selective price cuts for ECS customers
while maintaining higher prices for its own customers, AKZO UK's
departure from its previous pattern of full-cost recovery in flour
additives, and AKZO UK's subsidization of its below-cost transfer
prices from its plastic and elastomers division. 92
The Commission thus employed the cost-based evidence available
to substantiate the evidence of AKZO's subjective intent. Such an
approach is logical where, as in the instant matter, an overwhelming
array of uncontradicted subjective evidence exists. A similar approach,
however, may not be feasible where documentation of predatory intent
is not present. The Commission apparently realized this potential
shortcoming when it remarked that "given the difficulty of proof
[AKZO] would probably have succeeded in achieving its purpose of
eliminating ECS had the Commission not discovered the evidence on
which this decision is based." '  The Commission summarized its
attitude toward objective evidence in one paragraph:
There may be circumstances where the exclusionary consequences
of a price cutting campaign by a dominant producer are so self-
evident that no evidence of intention to eliminate a competitor is
necessary. On the other hand, where low pricing could be susceptible
of several explanations, evidence of an intention to eliminate a
competitor or restrict competition might also be required to prove
an infringement . . . . In the absence, however, of direct docu-
mentary evidence an exclusionary intention might be inferred from
all the circumstances of the case. 94
At first glance the Commission's summary of predation seems
sound; upon closer examination it becomes vague and inconclusive.
The Commission failed to indicate what type of exclusionary con-
9' Id. at 21.
92 Id. The Commission stressed that dominant firms were entitled to compete on
the merits, but that "[the maintenance of a system of effective competition ...
require[s] that a smaller competitor be protected against behavior by dominant
undertakings designed to exclude it from the market not by virtue of greater efficiency
or superior performance but by an abuse of market power." Id.
91 Id. at 25.
94 Id. at 21.
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sequences would be so "self-evident" as to permit an excuse from
the proof of intent requirement. Apparently, the injuries suffered by
ECS due to AKZO's conduct failed to reach that level, though the
Commission felt those injuries had a "serious effect" upon ECS's
business.95 In addition, the Commission did not pose any examples
of how low pricing could be susceptible to more than one explanation.
Finally, if the Commission were to infer an exclusionary intention
"from all the circumstances of the case" it would possess extraor-
dinary powers of interpretation in predation matters.
The Commission's reservations regarding cost-based evidence may
stem from its stated belief that there exists an "inherent difficulty"
in accurately determining costs.96 The Commission, however, con-
ducted a detailed analysis of AKZO UK's costs and convincingly
established that AKZO UK had priced below its average variable
costs. An examination of an alleged aggressor's costs and prices,
though complicated, should be paramount in determining whether
prices are predatory. While subjective evidence of an aggressor's intent
should also be studied closely, the Commission's adoption of a test
for predation, consisting of "whether the price cutting or other
behavior constitutes unreasonable or unfair behavior intended to
eliminate or damage the particular competitor,"7 may result in in-
consistent interpretations. As the United States Supreme Court has
astutely observed, "[tihe reasonable price fixed today may through
economic and business changes become the unreasonable price of
tomorrow." 98 To avoid the uncertainty and unpredictability of a
standard for predation based too firmly on subjective factors, the
Commission should adopt a test that emphasizes both objective and
subjective evidence. Such a test may be found in the decisions of
the courts of the United States.
IV. PREDATORY PRICING AND THE U.S. COURTS
A. The Areeda-Turner Test for Predation
In contrast to the Commission and the European Court of Justice,
the courts of the United States have considered numerous predatory
91 Id. at 14. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
96 ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EUR. Com. (No L. 374) at 20.
97 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 85 (1986).
98 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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pricing cases. 99 Because of this experience, the Court of Justice will
probably examine United States antitrust decisions, as it has done in
other areas of competition law, '00 when it attempts to define predatory
pricing.
Federal courts in the United States currently apply several versions
of a cost-based analysis known as the Areeda-Turner test in deter-
mining whether a given price is predatory. Devised by Harvard Uni-
versity Professors Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner in 1976, the
Areeda-Turner analysis concentrates on the relationship between a
firm's prices and costs to establish a clear dividing line between
competitive and predatory pricing.' 0' Areeda and Turner break down
the kinds of costs facing a firm into two categories. Fixed costs are
those that remain constant despite changes in output. 10 2 Such costs
include management expenses, depreciation, property taxes, and other
irreducible overhead. 103 Variable costs are those which fluctuate as
output changes. 1°4 Typical costs in this category include materials,
fuel, labor, utilities, and repair and maintenance.105 Whether costs
are considered fixed or variable depends upon the level of output
and time. °0 Three different concepts of the cost per unit of production
99 American case law has established predatory pricing as an antitrust offense
within the proscription on monopolization or attempts to monopolize in section 2
of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 182, (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43, (1911). Section
2 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony." Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1986).
In addition, the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,
protects companies from predation by prohibiting price discrimination. Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13a (1986).
100 See, e.g., BRT v. Sabam and NV Fonior, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 313,
14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238 (1974) (discussion of relevant market as developed by
United States federal courts); Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Comm'n of the
European Communities, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1281, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
864 (1973) (comparison of extraterritorial applications of United States and EEC
competition law).
101 Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975).
102 Id. at 700.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
11 Id. at 701. Areeda and Turner explain:
Virtually all costs are variable when a firm, operating at capacity, plans
to double its output by constructing new plants and purchasing new equip-
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are derived from fixed and variable cost: marginal cost, the increment
of total cost that results from producing an additional increment of
output; 107 average variable cost, the sum of all variable costs divided
by output;'08 and average cost, the sum of fixed cost and variable
cost divided by output./°9
According to Areeda and Turner, a rational, efficient firm always
maximizes profits by pricing at marginal cost, "the competitive and
socially optimal result."' 110 Therefore, Areeda and Turner argue that
a price set at or above marginal cost should be presumed lawful.",
Conversely, pricing below marginal cost should be conclusively re-
garded as unlawful, because a firm charging below-marginal cost
prices "is not only incurring private losses but wasting social re-
sources.""12 Areeda and Turner also believe that pricing below mar-
ginal cost greatly increases the possibility that competitors will be
eliminated." 3 Since preparing marginal cost records is not standard
business practice, Areeda and Turner advocate the substitution of
reasonably anticipated average variable cost for marginal cost in their
formula." 4 Finally, they conclude that instances of truly predatory
pricing are rare."5
ment. Moreover, more costs become variable as the time period increases.
The variable costs ... are those incurred in what is usually termed the
"short-run," namely, the period in which the firm cannot replace or increase
plant or equipment. Conversely, in the "long-run" the firm can vary
quantities of all inputs (plant and equipment as well as short-run variable
inputs); thus, all costs are variable over the long run.
Id.
10 Id. at 700.
log Id.
109 Id.
11o Id. at 711. Areeda and Turner argue that pricing at marginal cost ensures the
proper allocation of resources, since "to force the firm to charge a higher price
would reduce industry output and waste economic resources in the short run." Id.
Id.
d2 I . at 712. Areeda and Turner posit one exception to this rule. They propose
that a price below marginal cost is justifiable if it is at or above average cost, since
"it seems unlikely to have any significant anticompetitive consequences." Id. at 713.
Areeda and Turner reason that such a case would occur only in instances of excess
demand. If that excess demand is temporary, no new firms would attempt to enter
the market. If permanent, such pricing would have, at most, minimal effect upon
new entry, "since the price is higher than the monopolist's average cost at most
efficient levels of output, and equally efficient rivals or entrants would be making
above normal profits at that price." Id.
113 Id.
'1 Id. at 716. Traditional business accounts typically go no further than to show
average variable costs. Marginal cost equals average variable cost (AVC) when AVC
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The Areeda-Turner test for predatory pricing requires the careful
cost analysis which the Court of Justice urged the Commission to
undertake in United Brands and which the Commission conducted
in its ECS/AKZO final decision. Notwithstanding criticism of the
is constant. Moreover, though there is a possibility that AVC will differ from marginal
cost, AVC is a "useful surrogate" for predatory pricing analysis. Id. at 718.
"I Id. at 699. The federal courts, at least, appear to agree with this conclusion.
Since Areeda and Turner published their article in 1975, the federal courts have
heard approximately fifty-five predatory pricing cases. Many of those cases have
been decided for the defendant on summary motions. For a summary of predation
cases since 1975 and their dispositions, see Liebeler, Whither Predatory Pricing?
From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1052 app. at 1077
(1986).
Some antitrust scholars, however, disagree with the Supreme Court's conclusion
that predation is rare, arguing instead that the existing antitrust laws are not being
properly enforced. Dr. Mueller argues that "President Reagan entered office with
an agenda aimed at eliminating or greatly reducing government interference in all
areas of business affairs, with antitrust 'reform' near the top of his list." A New
Attack on Antitrust: The Chicago Case, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 29, 32
(1986). Dr. Mueller adds that "by changing the enforcement personnel and policies
of the antitrust agencies [and] by appointing judges with a known antiregulatory
bias," the Reagan administration "has been successful in changing antitrust policy
beyond the fondest hopes of [antitrust law's] enemies and the greatest fears of its
friends." Id. at 32.
Professor Ponsoldt of the University of Georgia School of Law testified before
Congress concerning the enforcement status of United States antitrust laws and
remarked on the European reaction to that status:
Right now, my foreign law students and European colleagues express to
me amazement or cynicism regarding the current divergence between the
illusion of our antitrust rules and the reality of their nonenforcement. They
simply do not believe our "Rule of Law" self-description at the present
time; many believe, instead, that big business is virtually outside political
and legal restraint.
Department of Justice Oversight and Authorization: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 26, 1987) (testimony of James F. Ponsoldt, Assoc. Professor
of Law at the Univ. of Ga. The testimony is on file at the offices of the Georgia
Journal of International and Comparative Law). See also Shepherd, The Twilight
of Antitrust, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 21 (1986).
While the Supreme Court adheres to the widely-held belief that predation is rare
because it is not a viable business strategy, see infra note 117, others argue the opposite.
See, e.g., Posner, Exclusionary Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. Cm. L. REv.
506, 515-23 (1974). Another view holds that such economic approaches are mistaken in
assuming that firms are rational actors who always seek profit-maximization. This
"experimental psychology" approach posits that "while predatory pricing may or
may not be rational profit-making behavior, it is a response consistent with the
general way in which human beings tend to respond to risk in real life." Gerla,
The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 Sw. L.J.
755, 756 (1985).
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original test," 6 the Areeda-Turner analysis has had a pronounced
impact upon the United States federal courts. Although the Supreme
Court has neither adopted nor rejected the analysis," 7 almost every
federal circuit court applies the test in some form."' The circuit court
applications are diverse, with the only common factor being their
reliance on marginal or average variable cost as the primary measure
of whether a price is predatory. 119
116 Authorities have attacked the Areeda-Turner standard for a variety of reasons.
See Bradley & Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the
Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738, 768 (1981) (problems of
proof involving calculations of average variable costs); Dirlam, Marginal Cost Pricing
Tests for Predation: Naive Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26 ANTITRUST
BULL. 769 (1981) (emphasis on narrow efficiency goals); Scherer, Predatory Pricing
and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HAgv. L. REv. 869 (1976) (emphasis on the
short-run).
117 The Supreme Court has only mentioned the Areeda-Turner cost-based test in
one case, Matushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
In Matsushita a group of United States manufacturers of television sets alleged that
21 Japanese television manufacturers had illegally conspired over a 20-year period
to drive the United States firms from the United States market. The Japanese scheme
allegedly consisted of maintaining artificially high prices for the Japanese televisions
in the Japanese market, while maintaining low prices for those televisions which
they exported to and sold in the United States. The Court broached the subject of
production costs by noting that "[tihere is a good deal of debate, both in the cases
and in the law reviews, about what 'cost' is relevant in such cases." Matsushita,
106 S. Ct. at 1355 n.8. The Court then declined to resolve the cost debate because
the claim fell under section 1 of the Sherman Act, not section 2. Id. In other dicta,
however, the Court alluded to possible future approval of the Areeda-Turner stand-
ard:
We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a theory
such as respondent's when the pricing in question is above some measure
of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner (citation omitted). As
a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost pricing
is sufficient to overcome the strong influence that rational businesses would
not enter into conspiracies such as this one.
Id. at 1355 n.9.
"8 See Henry v. Chloride, Inc. 809 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987); D.E. Rogers Assoc.
v. Garner-Denver Co., 718 F.2d 1431 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242
(1984); MCI Communications v. A.T. & T., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982); 0. Hommel
Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982);
Northeastern Tel. v. A.T. & T., 651 F.2d- 76 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
943 (1982); Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427
(7th Cir. 1980); Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Int'l Air Indus. v. American Excelsior
Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
119 See supra note 118.
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B. The Inglis Decision of the Ninth Circuit
The Court of Justice may wish to examine each adaptation of the
Areeda-Turner test applied by the circuit courts of the United States
to determine which, if any, supports both the Court's emphasis on
cost data and the Commission's concern for subjective evidence. The
circuit court with the most experience in the predatory pricing area,
however, is the Ninth Circuit. Since the publication of Areeda and
Turner's article in 1975, the Ninth Circuit has decided more predation
cases than any other circuit. 120 In its leading predatory pricing decision,
William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co.,'2 1
the Ninth Circuit devised a test which combines cost-based and intent-
based evidence into a balanced, comprehensive formula for detecting
predation.
The plaintiff in Inglis was a privately-owned bakery which dis-
tributed bread and rolls in northern California. 22 ITT, one of the
larger nation-wide wholesale bakeries in the United States, competed
directly with Inglis in the northern California private label bread
market.123 Inglis alleged that because of the growth of private label
120 According to one author, the Ninth Circuit has decided eleven predation cases
since 1975. Liebeler, supra note 115, at 1077-94. The Ninth Circuit ruled for the
defendant in nine of those cases. See Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184
(9th Cir. 1984); Transamerica Computer v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.
1983), aff'g 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp.,
693 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1982); D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix & Contracting
Co., 692 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1982); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT
Continental Baking, 668 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 1981); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley,
658 F.2d 1256 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Shipowners & Merchants
Towboat Co., 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'g per curiam, ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981);
Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrel & Co., 633 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1980); California
Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979); Janich Bros.
Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil,
541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit received 23 predation cases between
1975 and 1982 alone. Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation: The
Emerging Trends, 35 VAND. L. REv. 63 app. at 151-55 (1982).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of predation in Western Concrete
Structures v. Mitsui & Co., 760 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir. 1985). In Mitsui the court
overruled the lower court's finding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts which, if
true, would have established predatory conduct. Id. at 1018. The court concluded
that the plaintiff's allegations were thus sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
and remanded the case. Id. at 1020.
12, 668 F.2d 1014.
,22 Id. at 1024.
123 Id. The Inglis court, however, failed to discuss the shares of the relevant market
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bread manufacturers in the market, ITT instituted a systematic scheme
of predatory pricing intended to eliminate independent private whole-
salers. 24
Inglis introduced evidence that showed ITT had gradually reduced
its prices over a period of several years.' 25 Inglis argued that because
of this pricing policy, both ITT and Inglis incurred substantial losses
in the market until Inglis was driven out of business. 126 In addition,
Inglis presented evidence that ITT had made competing offers to
Inglis' customers, forcing Inglis to lower its own prices until it suffered
lost revenues. 127 Inglis also documented the evidence of an ITT scheme
designed to intentionally eliminate Inglis from the market. 12
Initially, the Inglis court took an approach to the alleged predatory
pricing similar to that of the Commission in ECS/AKZO. In Inglis
the Ninth Circuit posed as the general question in predation cases
whether the plaintiff "was a casualty of vigorous, but honest, com-
petition, or the victim of unfair and predatory tactics adopted by a
company intent on monopolizing the market.' 1 29 Unlike the Com-
mission, however, the Ninth Circuit gave great weight in its analysis
to cost-based information. Citing its approval of the use of marginal
or average variable cost statistics in its previous determinations of
predatory pricing, 130 the Inglis court stated that "[p]rices below the
average total cost, but above the average variable cost, may represent
a legitimate means of minimizing losses during [a] period of inade-
involved. The Federal Trade Commission, which orginally dismissed Inglis' case
against Continental, estimated these shares at 25.570 for Continental, 4.307 for
Inglis. ITT Continental Baking Co., 104 FTC 280, 413 (1984). Unlike AKZO,
Continental did not even hold the largest share of the relevant market; another
competitor possessed 34076. Id. The FTC concluded that it was "highly unlikely that
Continental could have acquired monopoly power in any of the relevant markets."
Id. at 412.
124 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1024.
125 Id. at 1025.
126 Id. at 1026.
127 Id. at 1025. Inglis actually lost only one of its clients to Continental. Id.
28 Id. The evidence Inglis presented comes nowhere near the "smoking gun"
produced by ECS. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text. According to the
Inglis court, the evidence "principally consisted of a report prepared by independent
consultants identifying strategies Continental might adopt to combat private label
competition. One alternative involved maintaining prices 'to hasten wholesaler exits."'
Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1025.
129 Id. at 1026.
1o Id. at 1032 citing California Computer, 613 F.2d at 727; Janich Bros., 570
F.2d at 848; Hanson, 541 F.2d at 1352.
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quate demand."' 3 ' The court reasoned that it is less likely that pricing
below average variable cost will be legitimate, since such a practice,
if sustained, would not allow the firm to recover any portion of its
fixed costs.'32
Although the Inglis court advocated the use of marginal or average
variable cost statistics in establishing predation, it did not endorse
the Areeda-Turner test without modification. Instead, the court in-
corporated proof of subjective intent into its analysis, examining such
evidence with a focus upon what a rational firm would have expected
its pricing policies to accomplish.' 33 The court did not make pro-
duction of such evidence mandatory, however, stressing that its focus
did not require the plaintiff in every case to present evidence of the
defendant's subjective state of mind. 34 Instead, the court indicated
that predatory pricing may be proved through an analysis of the
aggressor's prices and costs.'35 The court also specified that the defend-
ant must have anticipated that its low prices would have a destructive
effect upon competition and thus would enhance its market position. 136
A comparison of the initial discussions in Inglis and ECS/AKZO
reveals that the Ninth Circuit relies more on cost-based evidence than
does the Commission. While both decisions state that objective evi-
dence alone may establish predation, the Ninth Circuit's threshold
of anticipated destructive effect and increased market share appears
lower than the Commission's touchstone of self-evident consequences.
The two approaches agree, however, that pricing above average var-
iable cost may in some instances be considered predatory. As the
Commission explained, "[t]he important element is the rival's as-
sessment of the aggressor's determination to frustrate its expectations
... rather than whether or not the dominant firm covers its own
3I Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035.
132 Id.
113 Id. The court noted that pricing below average variable cost will result in "out-
of-pocket losses" on each unit the firm sells. Id.
'14 Id. at 1034. The court then stated that "a price should be considered predatory
if its anticipated benefits depended on its tendency to eliminate competition." Id.
This statement mirrors the Court of Justice's stand on the elimination of competition.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The Commission also stressed the im-
portance of intent to eliminate competition in its final decision in ECS/AKZO. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text.
135 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1034. The Commission also noted that predation could be
proven solely with objective evidence. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
The Court of Justice made the same observation with regard to excessive prices in
United Brands. See supra note 39.
136 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035.
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costs. There can thus be an anti-competitive object in price cutting
whether or not the aggressor sets its prices above or below its own
costs." '137 Moreover, both the Commission and the Inglis court stated
that pricing below average variable cost may, under some circum-
stances, be a legitimate business tactic. 3 '
The Inglis court, however, took its examination of costs and intent
one step further than the Commission. Rather than relying upon a
cursory discussion of when objective evidence alone might be sufficient
to establish predatory pricing, the Ninth Circuit devised a test for
predation which features a shifting burden of proof, determined by
cost-price relationships. 139 The Inglis test reiterates that a price must
be a threat toward competition as well as an attempt by the defendant
to realize monopoly power. Depending on the evidentiary circum-
stances present, the plaintiff must prove these anticipated benefits in
one of two ways:
1. If defendant's price is above average variable cost, the plaintiff
must prove that the price was nevertheless designed to injure com-
petition and realize monopoly profits.
2. If plaintiff proves that defendant's price is below average
variable cost, the defendant must show that its price was not designed
to injure competition. 14
ECS/AKZO Final Decision, 28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 374) at 20.
"3 Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035; COMMSSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 85 (1986).
139 The Inglis court stated:
[W]e hold that to establish predatory pricing a plaintiff must prove that
the anticipated benefits of a defendant's price depended on its tendency to
discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long-
term ability to reap the benefits of monopoly power. If the defendant's
prices were below average total cost but above average variable cost, the
plaintiff bears the burden of showing defendant's pricing was predatory.
If, however, the plaintiff proves that the defendant's prices were below
average variable cost, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case of
predatory pricing and the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
prices were justified without regard to any anticipated destructive effect
they might have on competitors.
Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1035-36.
140 Id. One year after deciding Inglis, the Ninth Circuit addressed predation in
Transamerica Computer, 698 F.2d at 1377. In that decision the court again refused
to rely solely on cost-based analysis, saying "[a] rule based exclusively on cost
forecloses consideration of other important factors, such as intent, market power,
market structure, and long-run behavior in evaluating the predatory impact of a
pricing decision." Id. at 1387. The court concluded that even prices set above average
total cost might have predatory connotations; in such a case, however, the plaintiff
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Subjective evidence of intent is integral to both situations. When
the defendant prices above average variable cost, the plaintiff may
still prove predatory pricing by presenting evidence showing the
defendant's predatory intent. When the defendant prices below av-
erage variable cost, he may use subjective evidence to show that his
price was not designed to injure competition, while the plaintiff might
present subjective evidence to refute the defendant's explanation.
Objective, cost-based evidence, however, remains the basis of the
Inglis analysis. Rather than allowing subjective evidence of intent to
determine predation, the Inglis test employs such evidence either to
support or defeat the assumptions of legality established by cost
factors.
Although several drawbacks to the Inglis analysis are apparent,
these drawbacks do not destroy the value of the test. Commentators
have noted that the cost data necessary for the analysis would require
a massive discovery effort. 14 1 But as evidenced by their prior decisions,
both the Commission and the Ninth Circuit have managed to collect
the evidence needed. 42 Concern over jury competence to properly
examine sophisticated cost data 43 is not justified in EEC matters, as
the Commission and Court of Justice are the only triers of fact.'"
Finally, although any generalized definition of fixed and variable
costs will be inapplicable to some industries, 45 the Inglis court has
devised a workable test for distinguishing fixed from variable costs.146
would have to prove predation by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1388.
Four circuits have addressed predatory pricing since the Inglis decision. See Henry
v. Chloride, Inc. 809 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1987); Southern Pacific Communications
v. A.T. & T., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984); D.E. Rogers Inc. v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 718 F.2d 1431 (6th Cir. 1983); Barry Wright Corp. v. Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227 (1st Cir. 1983). The Eighth and Sixth circuits have adopted the Inglis standard.
Henry, 809 F.2d at 1346; D.E. Rogers, 718 F.2d at 1437. In contrast, the District
of Columbia and First circuits declined to adopt any cost-based standard. Southern
Pacific, 740 F.2d at 1006; Barry Wright, 724 F.2d at 233.
"I Havenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983
AIuz. ST. L.J. 443, 454.
"42 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. In addition, the Commission's
investigatory powers under Regulation No. 17 make it especially adept at gathering
cost and price evidence. Id.
141 See, e.g., Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1063 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
-" See supra notes 1 and 19.
1' P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 715.2a at 146-47.
l,6 The Inglis court proposed that "to determine whether particular costs are
variable, one must evaluate the relationship of the prospective change in output to
that level of output which presently exists." Inglis, 668 F.2d at 1037. The Court
recommended that an analysis of average variable cost should begin with a comparison
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The benefits associated with the adoption of the Inglis test greatly
outweigh its possible shortcomings. Dominant firms will seldom choose
to price below average variable cost. Those that do price below that
level will know that such pricing will be legal if legitimate business
concerns force them to do so. Dominant firms also will be deterred
from pricing below average total cost unless they are confident that
no predatory intent is involved. These factors will thus afford busi-
nesses a greater ability to predict whether their pricing practices will
be considered predatory.
From the plaintiff's perspective, proof that the defendant priced
below average variable cost will establish a prima facie case of pre-
dation. Thus, the plaintiff's burden to produce subjective evidence
is less under the Inglis test than under an ECS/AKZO standard.
Plaintiff's burden to prove predatory intent when defendant's prices
are above average variable cost will be great, but it should be, for
in most market settings, pricing above average variable cost will still
be considered an example of "vigorous, but honest" price compe-
tition. "47
V. CONCLUSION
In its Fifteenth Competition Report, 48 the Commission addressed
the ECS/AKZO decision. Refusing to adopt a per se test for predation
based on marginal or variable cost, the Commission observed that
"[tihere may be cases where sale below cost even by a dominant
company is justified. Equally, a dominant firm does not need to sell
below its own costs in order to bring prices to a level where com-
petitors are forced from the market.' 49 Having stated its policy, the
Commission then failed to adopt any method of determining exactly
which factors constitute predation. Instead, the Commission presented
as its test "whether the price cutting or other behavior ... constitutes
of production costs before and after the alleged predatory price reduction. Variable
costs would be those expenses which increased because of the increased production
and lower price. Id. at 1037. The court concluded that determination of fixed and
variable costs must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 1038.
147 Renfrew, The Antitrust Jurisprudence of the Ninth Circuit, 41 A.B. CITY. N.Y.
196, 224-25 (1986).
141 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH REPORT ON COMPE-
TITION POLICY 85 (1986).
149 Id.
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unreasonable or unfair behavior intended to eliminate or damage the
particular competitor."' 50
The Commission proposes a test full of sound and fury, but its
application of that test in ECS/AKZO clarified the pitfalls that relying
upon such noncommital language creates. "Unreasonable" and "un-
fair" behavior might be easily identified in matters where subjective
evidence abounds. The Commission, however, gave little indication
of how it will determine the presence of those types of behavior in
the absence of self-damning documentation. Application of an Inglis-
type standard under the same circumstances would have provided the
same result while also providing practical guidance to other actors
in the market place. The Commission would have utilized its extensive
cost analysis to establish that AKZO had priced below average variable
cost, and then used the subjective evidence present to rebut any
inference by AKZO that its pricing was justified. Had the subjective
evidence not existed, the Commission still would have established a
prima facie case of predatory pricing against AKZO.
Shortly after the Commission's decision in ECS/AKZO, AKZO
lodged an action for annulment with the European Court of Justice. 5'
The Court possesses unlimited jurisdiction in competition cases, en-
abling it to review de. novo both facts and law.'52 If an appeal is
successful, the Court may declare void all or part of the Commission
decision. In addition, in cases such as ECS/AKZO where the Com-
mission imposes a fine, the Court may cancel, reduce or increase the
fine or periodic penalty payment imposed.'53
Despite its extensive powers of review, the Court's power is limited
because the Commission is under no legal obligation to apply decisions
of the Court in further Commission rulings. 15 4 The Court may, how-
ever, recommend that the Commission take certain action in upcoming
matters of a similar nature. Thus, when it considers the ECS/AKZO
decision, the Court of Justice should reaffirm the importance of
150 Id.
"I' See supra note 19.
132 Regulation No. 17 granted the Court of Justice this great power of review in
competition matters. See Regulation No. 17, supra note 19.
- Regulation No. 17, supra note 2, at art. 17.
114 The law of the EEC has as its foundation civil law systems of the European
continent, which have rejected stare decisis. The Court of Justice itself, modelled
upon the French Counseil d'Etat, does tend to follow its own decisions but deviates
for good reason. See LASOK & BRMGE, supra note 19, at 38-45. In the same manner,
the Commission does not consider itself bound by previous Court of Justice decisions.
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examining objective evidence in pricing cases.' 55 The Court also should
emphasize the importance of analyzing cost-based data in conjunction
with evidence concerning subjective intent. By stressing the need to
consider both objective and subjective evidence, the Court can strongly
advise the Commission to adopt a test for predatory pricing that
offers more predictability to businesses in the EEC and lessens the
possibility of inconsistent applications of EEC law.
In its review of the Commission's ECS/AKZO Final Decision, the
Court of Justice should strongly urge the Commission to apply a
comprehensive test for predation similar to that developed by the
Ninth Circuit in Inglis. The Commission should ultimately realize
that its adoption of such a test will afford more guidance and pre-
dictability to undertakings in the EEC concerning what constitutes
unfair pricing. If the Commission nevertheless chooses to muddle on
with its nebulous ECS/AKZO test for predation, it may find that
dominant firms, rather than curtailing their abuses, will instead work
only to prevent the discovery of subjective evidence that documents
their existing abusive practices.
Thomas G. Ehr
" See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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